

An appraisal of the impact Russia and Ukraine conflict on the global economy and peace (2021-2022)

Jibrin Ubale Yahaya

Department of Political Science, National Open of Nigeria University, Abuja, Nigeria.

Email: jibrinubaleyahaya@gmail.com; Tel: +234 8035876786.

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ABSTRACT: The unannounced war between Ukraine and Russia has taken the world politics, peace, economy, and global market systems by storm and the diplomatic efforts by world leaders to resolve the crisis have shown no sign of progress. Ukraine became an independent nation with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. It was earlier part of the Russian empire and later became the Soviet Republic and did away with its Russian imperial legacy, thereby forming close ties with the West. Since its independence, the country has been battling with corruption and internal divisions. The objective of the paper is to examine the implication of the Ukraine and Russia crisis on the global economy and peace. The paper has adopted using secondary sources of information by consulting relevant literature on the subject matter. The paper has two major findings firstly, the sovereignty of Ukraine as an independent country was not fully respected by Russia and secondly, superpower countries are playing politics with the conflict which led to further destruction of human beings and facilities between conflicting countries. The researcher recommends that neighbouring countries of Ukraine needs to recognize its statehood independence as an independent country and the superpower countries and other global communities need to show concern and make serious commitment to end the conflict between the two countries to restore the fate of global peace and economy in a good time.

Keywords: Conflict, global economy, global peace, sovereignty.

INTRODUCTION

The invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces has spurred Europe's worst security crisis in decades. But while most analysis is rightly focused on the immediate situation; it is equally important to forecast the war's multiple possible trajectories and outcomes. Anticipating the uncertainties that this war will bring is a critical step toward successfully navigating the possible consequences that have been raised on the global economy and peaceful living as a result of the crisis between the two conflicting countries. This paper has the central objective of critically finding the root cause of the crisis and suggesting possible means to the problem to restore the collapsing global peace and economy looking at the time and dates of the occurrences.

It was on the 24th of February 2022, that Russia invaded Ukraine in a major escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian War that began in 2014. The invasion caused Europe's largest refugee crisis since World War II, with more than 8 million

Ukrainians fleeing the country and a third of the population displaced. The invasion also caused global food shortages that have stormed the global communities (Luhn, 2014).

Barnes *et al.* (2022) has argued that in 2014, Russia invaded and annexed Crimea, and Russian-backed separatists seized part of the Donbas region of south-eastern Ukraine, consisting of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts, sparking a regional war. This crisis continued in 2021, when Russia along its border with Ukraine, amassed up to 190,000 troops and their equipment. In a televised address shortly before the invasion, Russian president Vladimir Putin espoused irredentist views, challenged Ukraine's right to statehood, and falsely claimed Ukraine was governed by neo-Nazis who persecuted the ethnic Russian minority. This has led to Russia recognising the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's

Republic, two self-proclaimed breakaway states in Donbas controlled by pro-Russian separatists on 21st February 2022. The following day, the Federation Council of Russia authorized the use of military force, and Russian troops overtly entered both territories.

The invasion began on the morning of 24 February, when Putin announced a "special military operation" to "demilitarise and denazify" Ukraine. Minutes later, missiles and airstrikes hit across Ukraine, including the capital Kyiv. A large ground invasion followed from multiple directions. Zelenskyy enacted martial law and a general mobilisation of all male Ukrainian citizens between 18 and 60, who were banned from leaving the country. Russian attacks were initially launched on a northern front from Belarus towards Kyiv, a north-eastern front towards Kharkiv, a southern front from Crimea, and a south-eastern front from Luhansk and Donetsk. During March 2022 the Russian advance towards Kyiv stalled. Amidst heavy losses and strong Ukrainian resistance, Russian troops retreated from Kyiv Oblast by 3 April. On 19 April 2022, Russia launched a renewed attack on Donbas, with simultaneous missile attacks directed at Kyiv in the north and Lviv in western Ukraine (Morin, 2022)

The invasion has received widespread international condemnation. The United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution condemning the invasion and demanding a full withdrawal of Russian forces. The International Court of Justice ordered Russia to suspend military operations and the Council of Europe expelled Russia. Many countries imposed sanctions on Russia, which have affected the economies of Russia and the world, and provided humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine. Protests occurred around the world; those in Russia were met with mass arrests and increased media censorship, including a ban on the words "war" and "invasion". The International Criminal Court has opened an investigation into crimes against humanity in Ukraine since 2013, as well as war crimes in the 2022 invasion.

Statement of problem

After the Soviet Union (USSR) dissolved in 1991, the newly Independent Republics of Ukraine and Russia maintained ties. Ukraine agreed in 1994 to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and dismantle the nuclear weapons in Ukraine left by the USSR. In return, Russia, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US) agreed in the Budapest Memorandum to uphold the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

Barbaro *et al.* (2022) cited that in 1999, Russia signed the Charter for European Security, which "reaffirmed the inherent right of each and every participating state to be free to choose or change its security arrangements, including treaties of alliance". After the Soviet Union collapsed, several former Eastern Bloc countries joined NATO, partly due to regional security threats such

as the 1993 Russian constitutional crisis, the War in Abkhazia (1992–1993) and the First Chechen War (1994–1996). Russian leaders claimed Western powers pledged that NATO would not expand eastward, although this is disputed.

The above statement led to the Euromaidan protests and a revolution resulting from the removal of pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovich in February 2014, pro-Russian unrest erupted in parts of Ukraine. Russian soldiers without insignia took control of strategic positions and infrastructure in the Ukrainian territory of Crimea and seized the Crimean Parliament.

Russia has organized a controversial referendum, whose outcome was for Crimea to join Russia. Russia's annexation of Crimea followed in March 2014, then the war in Donbas, which began in April 2014 with the formation of two Russia-backed separatist quasi-states: the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic. Russian troops were involved in the conflict. The Minsk agreements signed in September 2014 and February 2015 were a bid to stop the fighting, but ceasefires repeatedly failed. A dispute emerged over the role of Russia: Normandy Format members France, Germany, and Ukraine saw Minsk as an agreement between Russia and Ukraine, whereas Russia insisted Ukraine should negotiate directly with the two separatist republics. In 2021, Putin refused offers from Zelenskyy to hold high-level talks, and the Russian government subsequently endorsed an article by former president Dmitry Medvedev arguing it was pointless to deal with Ukraine while it remained a "vassal" of the Black Sea (Hernandez, 2022).

The annexation of Crimea led to a new wave of Russian nationalism, with much of the Russian neo-imperial movement aspiring to annex more Ukrainian land, including the unrecognized Novorossiia. An analyst Vladimir (2021) has argued that Putin's 2014 speech after the annexation of Crimea was a *de facto* "manifesto of Greater-Russia Irredentism". In July 2021, Putin published an essay titled "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians", reaffirming that Russians and Ukrainians were "one people".

The most dangerous scenario for the future of Europe and the global order is one in which the Ukraine conflict sets the stage for a direct military conflict between NATO and Russia. There are multiple pathways toward such an outcome, including:

1. NATO could decide to escalate its involvement in Ukraine by, for example, attempting to implement a no-fly zone or another form of direct intervention. For now, the United States and other NATO allies have rejected implementing a no-fly zone—but that calculus could change if Russia continues to escalate its bombardment of civilians. Russia would be forced to decide whether to back down or directly engage alliance military forces. If it chooses the latter, the risk

- of an escalating armed conflict between NATO and Russia would increase substantially.
2. Russia could inadvertently strike a NATO member's territory—for example, through imprecise targeting or erroneous identification of friend and foe—prompting countermeasures from the alliance (Russia already has attacked targets close to the Polish border). As the Russian military's stock of precision-guided munitions starts to dwindle, the risk of such an accident leading to an inadvertent escalation with NATO rises. This scenario would see the beginnings of direct conflict, perhaps air-to-air or air-to-ground, in border regions of Ukraine. In turn, this could set off a tit-for-tat cycle of strike and counterstrike leading to open hostilities.
 3. A fearful prospect concerns the possibility that Putin has broader designs well beyond Ukraine. If Russian forces make rapid progress in Ukraine and achieve effective control over the country, Putin may turn his attention to states that he covets as part of a desire to reconstitute a sphere of influence that broadly aligns with the territory of the former Soviet Union. The obvious candidates to test his designs, and the resolve of NATO itself, would be the Baltic states (all of which are members of the Alliance). Putin might harbor a belief that NATO will back down if pushed; NATO insists it will fight any Russian military incursion on a member state.

Research objectives

The paper has the general objective of evaluating the impact of Russia and Ukraine conflict on the global economy and peace, with the specific objectives as follow:

1. To examine the contentious issues of conflict between Russia and Ukraine.
2. To explore possible measures to address the problems.

Research questions

The paper has the following questions to asked:

1. What are major contentious issues of conflict between Russia and Ukraine?
2. What are possible measures to address the problems?

BURNING ISSUES THAT CAUSES THE ESCALATION OF THE RUSSIA/UKRAINE CONFLICT

Russian military buildups (March 2021–February 2022)

In March and April 2021, Russia began a major military build-up near the Russo-Ukrainian border. A second build-up followed from October 2021 to February 2022, in both

Russia and Belarus. Members of the Russian government repeatedly denied having plans to invade or attack Ukraine; including government spokesman Dmitry Peskov on 28 November 2021, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov on 19 January 2022, Russian ambassador to the US Anatoly Antonov on 20 February 2022, and Russian ambassador to the Czech Republic Alexander Zmeevsky on 23 February 2022 (Nikolskaya and Osborn, 2022)

Morin (2022) has cited the Putin's Chief National Security Adviser, Nikolai Patrushev, believed that the West had been in an undeclared war with Russia for years. Russia's updated national security strategy, published in May 2021, said that Russia may use "forceful methods" to "thwart or avert unfriendly actions that threaten the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation". Sources say the decision to invade Ukraine was made by Putin and a small group of war hawks in Putin's inner circle, including Patrushev and Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu.

When in early December 2021 Russia denied plans to invade, the US released intelligence, including satellite photographs of Russian troops and equipment near the Russo-Ukrainian border, that indicated otherwise, and continued to accurately predict invasion events. The intelligence also said that the Russians had a list of key sites, and of individuals to be killed or neutralised in the invasion.

Russian accusations and demands

Lister and Kesa (2022) have described that during the invasion of Ukraine, Russian officials accused Ukraine of Russophobia, inciting tensions, and repressing Russian speakers in Ukraine. They also made multiple security demands of Ukraine, NATO, and non-NATO allies in the European Union. Commentators and Western officials described these as attempts to justify war. "Russophobia is a first step towards genocide", Putin said on 9 December 2021. Putin's claims about "de-Nazification" have been described as absurd, and Russian claims of genocide were widely rejected as baseless. Putin's claims were "factually wrong". Both Lavrov and Putin were criticized by US Ambassador Deborah Lipstadt for their weaponization of nazism and of the holocaust as being racially prejudiced when she stated that Lavrov's use of referring to Hitler's mother as Jewish and therefore inferring that Jews brought the Holocaust upon themselves was caustic by Lavrov in its direct inferences. Lipstadt similarly criticized the two Russian leaders for their weaponization of the term nazism for their own self-interest. Zelenskyy declared that 16 February, a speculated date for the invasion, a "Day of Unity".

Putin challenged the legitimacy of the Ukrainian state and claimed that "Ukraine never had a tradition of genuine

statehood", incorrectly described it as created by Soviet Russia, and falsely said Ukrainian society and government were dominated by neo-Nazism.

Ukraine, like pro-Russian separatists in Donbas, has a far-right fringe, including the neo-Nazi-linked Azov Battalion and Right Sector, but experts have described Putin's rhetoric as greatly exaggerating the influence of far-right groups within Ukraine; there is no widespread support for the ideology in the government, military, or electorate. Zelenskyy, who is Jewish, rebuked Putin's allegations, noting that his grandfather served in the Soviet army fighting Nazis. The US Holocaust Memorial Museum and Yad Vashem condemned this use of Holocaust history and allusion to Nazi ideology in propaganda. During the second build-up, Russia demanded that the US and NATO enter into a legally binding arrangement preventing Ukraine from ever joining NATO, and remove multinational forces from NATO's Eastern European member states. Russia threatened an unspecified military response if NATO followed an "aggressive line". These demands were widely seen as non-viable; new NATO members in Central and Eastern Europe had joined the alliance because they preferred the safety and economic opportunities offered by NATO and the EU, and their governments sought protection from Russian irredentism. A formal treaty to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO would contravene the treaty's "open door" policy, despite NATO's unenthusiastic response to Ukrainian requests (Murphy, 2022).

Emmanuel Macron and Olaf Scholz made efforts to prevent the war in February, 2022. Macron met with Putin but failed to convince him not to go forward with the attack. Scholz warned Putin about heavy sanctions that would be imposed if the invasion happens. Scholz also pleaded with Zelensky to renounce the aspiration to join NATO and declare neutrality, however Zelensky refused it. This statement shows the gravity and eagerness of Russia to invent Ukraine for a war because of its decisions of joining NATO.

Alleged clashes (17–21 February 2022)

Rodionov and Balmforth (2022) has cited the nature of fighting in Donbas escalated after 17 February 2022. Ukraine and Donbas each accused the other of firing across the line of conflict. On 18 February, 2022 the Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics ordered all civilians to leave their capitals, Ukrainian media described a sharp increase in artillery shelling by the Russian-led militants in Donbas as an attempt to provoke the Ukrainian army. On 19 February, 2022 both separatist republics declared full mobilization.

Further escalation of the crisis (21–23 February 2022)

On 21 February, 2022 Russian government recognised

the Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics. The same evening, Putin ordered Russian troops into Donbas, on what he called a "peacekeeping mission". Several members of the UN Security Council condemned the 21 February, 2022 intervention in Donbas; none voiced support. On 22 February, 2022 video footage shot in the early morning showed Russian armed forces and tanks moving in the Donbas region. The Federation Council authorised the use of military force outside Russia. Zelenskyy called up army reservists; and Ukraine's parliament proclaimed a 30-day national state of emergency. Russia evacuated its embassy from Kyiv. Many attacks has widely attributed to Russian-backed hackers hit the websites of the Ukrainian parliament and executive branch, and many bank websites also. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) denied reports of Chinese military espionage on the eve of the invasion, including on nuclear infrastructure (Ratcliffe *et al.*, 2022).

However, again on the 23rd of February, Zelenskyy gave a speech in Russian, appealing to Russian citizens to prevent war. He refuted Russian claims of neo-Nazis in the Ukrainian government and said that he had no intention of attacking Donbas. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on 23rd February 2022 that separatist leaders in Donetsk and Luhansk had sent Putin a letter saying that Ukrainian shelling had caused civilian deaths and appealing for military support from Russia. Ukraine requested an urgent UN Security Council meeting. Half an hour into the emergency meeting, Putin announced the start of military operations in Ukraine. Sergiy Kyslytsya, the Ukrainian representative, called on the Russian representative, Vasily Nebenzya, to "do everything possible to stop the war" or relinquish his position as president of the UN Security Council; Nebenzya refused.

Declaration of military operations

Pitta (2022) has observed that on 24 February 2022 before 5:00 a. m. Kyiv time, Putin announced a "special military operation" in eastern Ukraine and "effectively declared war on Ukraine". In his speech, Putin said he had no plans to occupy Ukrainian territory and that he supported the right of the Ukrainian people to self-determination. He said the purpose of the "operation" was to "protect the people" in the predominantly Russian-speaking region of Donbas who, according to him, "for eight years now, had been facing humiliation and genocide perpetrated by the Kyiv regime".

Putin said that Russia sought "demilitarisation and denazification" of Ukraine. Within minutes of Putin's announcement, explosions were reported in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odessa, and the Donbas region. An alleged leaked report from within the FSB claimed that the intelligence agency was not warned of Putin's plan to invade Ukraine. Immediately following the attack, Zelenskyy declared martial law

in Ukraine. The same evening, he ordered a general mobilisation of all Ukrainian males between 18 and 60 years old who were prohibited from leaving the country. Russian troops entered Ukraine from the north-east in Russia (towards Kharkiv); from the east in the DPR and the Luhansk People's Republic; and from the south in Crimea. Russian equipment and vehicles were marked with a white Z military symbol (a non-Cyrillic letter), believed to be a measure to prevent friendly fire (Kirby and Guyer, 2022).

However, the above statement of the President Putin, Russia has already finished her war plan to crush the Ukraine through uses of war strategy despite various warning and lobbying from UK, France, USA and the UN Security Council but his does not stop to embark on the war mission to Ukraine that economically causes a shortage of some commodities that demanded by the global communities like wheat and gas as well as the stability of peace in the European countries.

Invasion and resistance

In this paper we need to know what happen after the invasion and also understand the consequence of that action to the global economy and peace. Hodge (2022) has emphasized that the invasion began at dawn of 24 February, 2022 with infantry divisions and armoured and air support in Eastern Ukraine, and dozens of missile attacks across both Eastern Ukraine and Western Ukraine. The first fighting took place in Luhansk Oblast near Milove village on the border with Russia at 3:40 a.m. Kyiv time. The main infantry and tank attacks were launched in four spearhead incursions, creating a northern front launched towards Kyiv, a southern front originating in Crimea, a south-eastern front launched at the cities of Luhansk and Donbas, and an eastern front. Dozens of missiles strike across Ukraine reached as far west as Lviv. Wagner Group mercenaries and Chechen forces reportedly made several attempts to assassinate Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The Ukrainian government said these efforts were thwarted by anti-war officials in Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), who shared intelligence of the plans.

Hodge, continue highlight of the nature of the invasion which has took place on 25 March, the Russian Defence Ministry said the "first stage" of what they called the "military operation in Ukraine" was generally complete, that the Ukrainian military forces had suffered serious losses, and the Russian military would now concentrate on the "liberation of Donbas". The "first stage" of the invasion was conducted on four fronts including one towards western Kyiv from Belarus, conducted by the Russian Eastern Military District, comprising the 29th, 35th, and 36th Combined Arms Armies. A second axis deployed towards eastern Kyiv from Russia by the Central Military

District (north-eastern front), comprised the 41st Combined Arms Army and 2nd Guards Combined Arms Army. A third axis deployed towards Kharkiv by the Western Military District (eastern front), with the 1st Guards Tank Army and 20th Combined Arms Army. A fourth, southern, front originating in occupied Crimea and Russia's Rostov oblast with an eastern axis towards Odessa and a western area of operations toward Mariupol, by the Southern Military District, including the 58th, 49th, and 8th Combined Arms Army, the latter also commanding the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian separatist forces in Donbas.

By 7th April, 2022, Russian troops deployed to the northern front by the Russian Eastern Military District pulled back from the Kyiv offensive, apparently to resupply and then redeploy to the Donbas region to reinforce the renewed invasion of south-eastern Ukraine. The north-eastern front, including the Central Military District, was similarly withdrawn for resupply and redeployment to south-eastern Ukraine. By 8th April, 2022, General Alexander Dvornikov was placed in charge of military operations during the invasion. On 18th April, retired Lieutenant General Douglas Lute, the former US ambassador to NATO, reported in a PBS News Hour interview that Russia had repositioned its troops to initiate a new assault on Eastern Ukraine which would be limited to Russia's original deployment of 150,000 to 190,000 troops for the invasion, though the troops were being well supplied from adequate weapon stockpiles in Russia. For Lute, this contrasted sharply with the vast size of the Ukrainian conscription of all-male Ukrainian citizens between 16 and 60 years of age, but without adequate weapons in Ukraine's highly limited stockpiles of weapons. On 26 April, delegates of the US and 40 allied nations met at Ramstein Air Base in Germany to discuss forming a coalition to provide economic support and military supplies and refitting to Ukraine. Following Putin's Victory Day speech in early May, US Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines said no short term resolution to the invasion should be expected (Hodge, 2022).

Russian forces improved their focus on protecting their supply lines by advancing more slowly, and more methodically. They also benefited from centralizing command under General Dvornikov. Ukraine's reliance on Western-supplied equipment constrained it, as Western countries feared that Ukraine would use it to strike targets in Russia. Military experts disagree on the future of the conflict; some have suggested trading territory for peace, while others believe that Ukraine can sustain their resistance to the invasion, due to the Russian losses. On 26 May 2022, the Conflict Intelligence Team, citing Russian soldiers, reported that Colonel General Gennady Zhidko had been put in charge of Russian forces during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, replacing Army General Dvornikov. By 30 May, disparities between Russian and Ukrainian artillery were apparent. Russian

artillery had a longer range, for example. In response to Biden's indication that enhanced artillery would be provided to Ukraine, Putin indicated that Russia would expand its invasion front to include new cities in Ukraine and in apparent retribution ordered a missile strike against Kyiv on 6 June after not directly attacking the city for several weeks. On 10th June 2022, Vadym Skibitsky, deputy head of Ukraine's military intelligence, stated during the Severodonetsk campaign that the frontlines were where the future of the invasion would be decided: "This is an artillery war now, and we are losing in terms of artillery. Everything now depends on what [the west] gives us. Ukraine has one artillery piece to 10 to 15 Russian artillery pieces. Our western partners have given us about 10% of what they have (Grunau, 2022).

Foreign military support

In this part of the paper, the strength of the conflicting countries was discussed between the stronger and the weaker tone. It was understood that one country is more strong and powerful against the other one that simply to say Russia is more powerful than the Ukraine in terms of military and war strategy mechanism that bow the weaker one which is the Ukraine to seek military support from the working power countries and other international organizations for more military support for the purpose of protection and reversal attacks to Russia.

Since 2014, the UK, US, EU, and NATO have provided mostly non-lethal military aid to Ukraine. Lethal military support was initially limited. The US began to sell weapons including Javelin anti-tank missiles starting in 2018, and Ukraine agreed to purchase TB2 combat drones from Turkey in 2019. Russia built up equipment and troops on Ukraine's borders in January 2022. The US worked with other NATO member states to transfer US-produced weapons to Ukraine. The UK also began to supply Ukraine with NLAW and Javelin anti-tank weapons. After the invasion, NATO member states including Germany agreed to supply weapons, but NATO as an organisation did not. NATO and its members also refused to send troops into Ukraine, or to establish a no fly-zone, lest this sparks a larger-scale war, a decision some labelled appeasement (Simon, 2022).

Budjeryn (2022) has further express how the support to Ukraine continues to go up which on 26 February 2022 US Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced \$350 million in lethal military assistance, including anti-armour and anti-aircraft systems. The next day the EU stated that it would purchase €450 million (US\$502 million) in lethal assistance and an additional €50 million (\$56 million) in non-lethal supplies for Ukraine, with Poland handling distribution. During the first week of the invasion, NATO member states supplied more than 17,000 anti-tank weapons to Ukraine; by mid-March, 2022 the number was

estimated to be more than 20,000. In three tranches agreed in February, March and April 2022, the European Union committed to €1.5 billion to support the capabilities and resilience of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the protection of the Ukrainian civilian population, under the purview of the European Peace Facility line. As of 11 April, 2022 Ukraine, had been provided with approximately 25,000 anti-air and 60,000 anti-tank weapon systems by the US and its allies. The following day, Russia reportedly received anti-tank missiles and RPGs from Iran, supplied through undercover networks via Iraq.

On 19 April 2022, Romania announced a planned reform to the government decree that regulates the export of military weapons and national defence products in order to provide these weapons not only to NATO allies but also to Ukraine. The Ministry of Defense developed the draft decree which states that the reason behind this decision was Russia's aggression against Ukraine. However, on 27th April, 2022 Defense Minister Vasile Dincu said that his plan had been discontinued. On 26 April, the US convened a conference in which representatives of more than 40 countries met at the Ramstein Air Base to discuss military support for Ukraine.

On 28 April, 2022, US President Biden asked Congress for an additional \$33 billion to assist Ukraine, including \$20 billion to provide weapons to Ukraine. On 5 May, 2022, Ukraine's Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal announced that Ukraine had received more than \$12 billion worth of weapons and financial aid from Western countries since the start of Russia's invasion on 24 February. On 10 May, 2022 the House passed legislation that would provide \$40 billion in new aid to Ukraine. After the legislation was approved by the Senate, Biden signed the legislation on 21 May, 2022. On 30 May French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna announced the provision to Ukraine of additional CAESAR self-propelled howitzer self-propelled howitzer systems, mounted on the Renault Sherpa 5 6x6 chassis. On May 25, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Valery Zaluzhny said that the first batch was already on the front lines fighting the invader. On 10 June, the AFU demonstrated the combat systems to representatives from the press; by that date the Ukrainian gunners had possession of 18 CAESAR units. On 31 May the White House informed the press that the US would be supplying HIMARS multiple launch rocket system to Ukraine. Some analysts have said HIMARS can be a "game-changer" in the war. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl stated that the US would be able to send more systems as the fighting evolves (Taylor, 2022).

Troianovski (2022) has also reemphasize the support received during the period of the its conflict with Russia, which cited that on 5 June Spain offered to donate to Ukraine 40 surplus Leopard 2 German-built third-generation tanks, pending approval from Olaf Scholz. On 10 June it was reported by *Der Spiegel* that Scholz blocked the

Table 1. Casualties of the Russo-Ukrainian War.

Breakdown	Casualties	Time period	Source
Civilians	12,000–27,906+ killed (est.) [448] [d]	24 February – 23 June 2022	Ukrainian government
	4,600 killed (conf.) [449]	24 February – 23 May 2022	
	730 killed, 2,357 wounded	17 February – 23 June 2022	DPR
	4,677+ killed, 5,829+ wounded	24 February – 23 June 2022	United Nations
Ukrainian forces (ZSU, NGU)	23,367 killed	24 February – 16 April 2022	Russian government
	5,500 –11,000 killed, 18,000 + wounded	24 February – 19 April 2022	US estimate
	10,000 killed, 30,000 wounded	24 February – 3 June 2022	Ukrainian government
Russian forces (military, Rosgvardiya, FSB)	4,010+ killed	24 February – 23 June 2022	BBC News Russian & Meduza
	3,854+ killed	24 February – 23 June 2022	IStories
Donetsk People's Republic forces	2,183 killed, 9,196 wounded	26 February – 23 June 2022	Donetsk People's Republic[f]
Luhansk People's Republic forces	500–600 killed	24 February – 5 April 2022	Russian government [g]
Russian and allied forces (RAF, Rosgvardiya, FSB, PMC Wagner, DPR & LPR)	16,000 killed	24 February – 15 June 2022	US estimate
	34,530 losses[h]	24 February – 24 June 2022	Ukrainian government

transaction. On 10 June an official from the Ukrainian military said that they were using 5,000 to 6,000 artillery rounds a day and were then using 155-calibre Nato standard shells because all their Soviet-era guns had been destroyed. The official said the Russians had transformed the war into an artillery duel focused on the southeast of the country. On 12 June a Ukrainian Presidential advisor put on Twitter a list of weapons that Ukraine needs to achieve "heavy weapons parity". The top item is "1000 howitzers caliber 155 mm". Ukraine claims it has enough 155 mm ammunition, it lacks the artillery to use it. According to Oryxspioenkop, only 250 howitzers have been promised or delivered. On 13 June, a Deutsche Welle correspondent said that the Ukrainian supply of Soviet-era ammunition had been exhausted and all they had as a dwindling supply obtained from friendly ex-Soviet countries.

CASUALTIES OF THE RUSSO-UKRAINIAN WAR

Here the paper highlight the casualties enqueued by the conflict that emerge between the two countries of Russia and Ukraine which has resulted to loss of lives of thousands of innocent civilians of both two countries and has affect the economic production of thousands of industries because no peaceful environment yield nothing

meaningful (Table 1).

Combat deaths can be inferred from a variety of sources, including satellite imagery and video footage of military actions. Both Russian and Ukrainian sources are widely considered to inflate casualty numbers in opposing forces, while downplaying their own losses for the sake of morale. Both sides also tend to be quieter about their own military fatalities, with Russian news outlets having largely stopped reporting the Russian death toll. Russia and Ukraine admitted to suffering "significant" and "considerable" losses, respectively. According to BBC News, Ukrainian claims of Russian fatalities were including the injured as well. AFP, as well as independent conflict monitors, reported that they had not been able to verify Russian and Ukrainian claims of enemy losses, but suspected they were inflated (Paulick, 2022).

Li *et al.* (2022) has cited that the number of civilian and military deaths is impossible to determine with precision given the fog of war. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) considers the number of civilian casualties to be considerably higher than the figure the United Nations are able to certify. On 16 June, the Ukrainian Minister of Defense told CNN that he believed tens of thousands of Ukrainians had died; adding that he "hoped" that the true death toll was below not 100,000.

THE IMPACT OF RUSSIA AND UKRAINE CONFLICT ON GLOBAL PEACE AND ECONOMY

Here, the researcher give some key highlight on some economic and peace implication that the conflict brought to the global communities which has serious effect on the lives of many peoples not only from the two countries rather affected many nations from various perspectives.

2022 Ukrainian refugee crisis

Hinton (2022) has raised a point that conflict between Russia and Ukraine has caused the largest refugee and humanitarian crisis within Europe which the world has not witness since the Yugoslav Wars in the 1990s; the UN described it as the fastest-growing such crisis since World War II. As Russia built up military forces along the Ukrainian border, many neighbouring governments and aid organizations prepared for a mass displacement event in the weeks before the invasion. In December 2021, the Ukrainian defence minister estimated that an invasion could force three to five million people to flee their homes.

In the first week of the invasion, the UN reported over a million refugees had fled Ukraine; this subsequently rose to over 7.5 million by 15th June, 2022. Most refugees were women, children, the elderly, or people with disabilities. As of 3 May, another 8 million people were displaced inside Ukraine. By 20 March, 2022 a total of ten million Ukrainians had fled their homes, making it the fastest-growing refugee crisis in the contemporary era. Most male Ukrainian nationals aged 18 to 60 were denied exit from Ukraine as part of mandatory conscription, 2022 unless they were responsible for the financial support of three or more children, single fathers, or were the parent/guardian of children with disabilities. Many Ukrainian men, including teenagers, in any case opted to remain in Ukraine to join the resistance.

According to the UN High Commission for Refugees, as of 13 May, 2022 there were 3,315,711 refugees in Poland, 901,696 in Romania, 594,664 in Hungary, 461,742 in Moldova, 415,402 in Slovakia, and 27,308 in Belarus, while Russia reported it had received over 800,104 refugees. As of 23 March, 2022 over 300,000 refugees had arrived in the Czech Republic. Turkey has been another significant destination, registering more than 58,000 Ukrainian refugees as of 22 March, 2022 and more than 58,000 as of 25 April 2022. The EU invoked the Temporary Protection Directive for the first time in its history, granting Ukrainian refugees the right to live and work in the EU for up to three years (Tabarovsky and Finkel, 2022).

Ukraine has accused Russia of forcibly moving civilians to "filtration centers" in Russian-held territory and thence to Russia, which Ukrainian sources compared to Soviet-era population transfers and Russian actions in the Chechen War of Independence. As of 8 April, 2022 Russia

claimed to have evacuated about 121,000 Mariupol residents to Russia. RIA Novosti and Ukrainian officials said that thousands were dispatched to various centers in cities in Russia and Russian-occupied Ukraine, from which people were sent to economically depressed regions of Russia. Ukraine's National Security and Defence Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov said Russia also plans to build concentration camps for Ukrainians in western Siberia, where prisoners will be forced to help build new cities (Hendrix and Khurshudyan, 2022).

Shekhovtsov (2022) has argued that on 20th May, 2022, NPR reported that, following a significant influx of foreign military equipment into Ukraine, a significant number of refugees are seeking to return to regions of Ukraine which are relatively isolated from the invasion front in south-eastern Ukraine. A second refugee crisis created by the invasion and by the Russian government's suppression of human rights has been the flight of more than 300,000 Russian political refugees and economic migrants, the largest exodus from Russia since the October Revolution of 1917, to countries such as the Baltic states, Finland, Georgia, Turkey, and Central Asia. On 22nd March, it was estimated that between 50,000 and 70,000 high-tech workers had left the country, and that 70,000 to 100,000 more might follow. Fears arose over the effect of this flight of talent on Russian economic development. Some joined the Russian resistance to the Putin regime and sought to help Ukraine, and some faced discrimination for being Russian. There has also been an exodus of millionaires. On 6th May, 2022, The Moscow Times, citing data from the FSB reported that almost four million Russians had left the country, although this figure does not distinguish between emigres and travellers for business or tourism, etc.

International sanctions during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and Economic impact of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine

Western countries and others imposed limited sanctions on Russia when it recognized Donbas as an independent nation. When the attack began, many other countries applied sanctions intended to cripple the Russian economy. The sanctions targeted individuals, banks, businesses, monetary exchanges, bank transfers, exports, and imports. The sanctions cut major Russian banks from SWIFT, the global messaging network for international payments, but left some limited accessibility to ensure the continued ability to pay for gas shipments. Sanctions also included asset freezes on the Russian Central Bank, which holds \$630 billion in foreign-exchange reserves, to prevent it from offsetting the impact of the sanction and froze the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. By 1 March, total Russian assets frozen by sanctions amounted to \$1 trillion (Düben, 2021).

Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), warned that the conflict posed a substantial economic risk both regionally and internationally. The IMF could help other countries affected, she said, in addition to the \$2.2 billion loan package for Ukraine. David Malpass, president of the World Bank Group, warned of far-reaching economic and social effects and reported that the bank was preparing options for significant economic and fiscal support to Ukraine and the region. Economic sanctions affected Russia from the first day of the invasion, with its stock market falling by up to 39% (RTS Index). The Russian ruble fell to record lows, and Russians rushed to exchange currency. Stock exchanges in Moscow and Saint Petersburg closed until at least 18 March 2022 the longest closure in Russia's history. On 26 February, S&P Global Ratings downgraded the Russian government credit rating to "junk", causing funds that require investment-grade bonds to dump Russian debt, making further borrowing very difficult for Russia. On 11 April 2022, S&P Global placed Russia under "selective default" on its foreign debt for insisting on payments in rubles (Berger, 2022).

Hodge (2022) has cited how the National Bank of Ukraine suspended currency markets, announcing that it would fix the official exchange rate. The central bank also limited cash withdrawals to 100,000 hryvnia a day and prohibited foreign currency withdrawals by the general public. The PFTS Ukraine Stock Exchange on 24 February suspended trading due to the emergency. On 24 March 2022, Joe Biden's administration issued an executive order, which barred the sale of Russian gold reserves in the international market. Gold has been one of Russia's major avenues to protect its economy from the impact of the sanctions imposed since the 2014 annexation of Crimea. In April 2022, Russia supplied 45% of the EU's natural gas imports, earning \$900 million a day. Russia is the world's largest exporter of natural gas, grains, and fertilisers, and among the world's largest suppliers of crude oil, coal, steel and metals, including palladium, platinum, gold, cobalt, nickel, and aluminium. In May 2022, the European Commission proposed a ban on oil imports from Russia. Due to the sanctions imposed on Russia, Moscow is now looking to capitalise on alternative trade routes as the country has practically broken all logistic corridors for trade.

However, again on the June 14th, 2022, Russia's Gazprom has announced it will be slashing gas flow via the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, due to (what it claimed) was Siemens' failure to return compressor units on time that had been sent off to Canada for repair. The explanation was challenged by Germany's energy regulator. While on 17th June 2022, President Putin spoke to investors at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum about economic sanctions, saying: "The economic blitzkrieg against Russia had no chance of succeeding from the very beginning". He further claimed that they would hurt those

imposing them more than Russia. Calling them "mad and thoughtless". He said to the investors: "Invest here. It is safer in your own house. Those who did not want to listen to this have lost millions abroad" (Berger, 2022).

Lost in the energy sector

Barners (2022) has an opinion that the war in Ukraine has raised up more open dangers of Europe's dependency on Russian gas. Current tensions have stoked fears of a disruption of Russian gas flows. This would intensify existing energy shortages and lead to even higher prices for European consumers who are experiencing a severe cost-of-living crisis. Against this backdrop, replacing Russian gas with Middle Eastern gas seems to be an attractive solution. But it is easier said than done.

Qatar, as the world's second-largest producer of liquefied natural gas (LNG), has so far been the main focus of efforts to find alternative energy supplies. Since late January, Washington has been pushing Doha to reroute gas exports to Europe. However, Qatari production is close to maximum capacity, with much of its supply tied up in contracts with key customers in Asia. If the US fails to convince its Asian partners to release some of their purchases for delivery to Europe, new gas supplies will be limited and delivered at spot market prices, which are already at an all-time high.

Qatar's bargaining power is enhanced by a lack of alternatives, especially since Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates do not have comparable LNG production and export capabilities. But Saudi Arabia is important to the energy mix in other ways. An escalation of the Russia-Ukraine conflict could reduce Russian oil supplies, prices of which have already skyrocketed. Riyadh is under significant US pressure to increase its oil production to drive down prices. So far, it has refused to do so – because higher prices are boosting its revenues, accelerating its recovery from the pandemic. But heightened conflict will intensify Western demands. Saudi Arabia may also sense an opportunity to challenge Russia's dominance over the eastern European oil market, using its recent inroads into Poland to try to seize a greater global market share.

North Africa represents another potential solution to Europe's energy woes, given Algeria's and Libya's positions as possible alternative gas suppliers. But this too would come with significant complications, not least the way in which North Africa's messy politics could threaten the stability of supplies.

Escalating tensions between Algiers and Rabat have already halted energy exports through the pipeline that connects Algeria and Spain. The long-standing animosity between the sides offers little hope of a swift resolution – though the Ukraine crisis could prompt stronger European efforts to mediate the dispute. However, Algeria could still provide LNG supplies to Europe or export more gas

eastwards through a pipeline to Italy.

Meanwhile, Libya's political instability and the ongoing threat of conflict make it a troublesome energy partner, particularly given its limited extra capacity. Europeans may support whoever they see as capable of providing short-term stability in western Libya, the location of a major gas pipeline. But this would not be a sustainable solution. Russia could complicate these dynamics further by leveraging its presence in eastern Libya and the country's oil fields to disrupt energy flows to Europe.

Conflict of geopolitics

The Russia-Ukraine conflict could provide Middle Eastern and North African states with significant new leverage over the US and Europe. Both Qatar and Saudi Arabia will likely seek to use energy dynamics to strengthen their positions. The US designation of Qatar as a major non-NATO ally in January 2022 may be one gesture in this direction. But Qatar will likely want Europe to make concessions. Top of its list may be for the European Commission to shelve a four-year investigation into Qatar's alleged use of long-term contracts to inhibit the flow of gas to the European single market.

In Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) wants to escape the status of international pariah he has had since Jamal Khashoggi's murder in 2018. Riyadh could seek to use US and European requests for increased oil supplies to regain the West's good favour. This could involve a long-sought meeting with US President Joe Biden and a general softening of US criticism of Saudi Arabia. The Western priority of keeping Turkey and other regional states onside is likely to overshadow concerns about values and human rights. Turkey has also be an important part of the equation, given that it is a NATO member and has close ties with both Russia and Ukraine. Like MBS, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been shunned by Europe and the Biden administration. But the conflict in Ukraine would enhance his visibility and increase Turkey's importance. Russia and the West are now competing to draw Ankara behind their respective positions on Ukraine – with Washington keen for Ankara to continue its weapons sales to Kyiv. Turkey is unlikely to fully align with the West against Russia, given its complicated relationship with the country. But these dynamics will doubtlessly lead to a more self-confident Turkish foreign policy – especially in the Mediterranean and Syria – and toned-down Western criticism of Erdogan's domestic conduct.

Global food insecurity

Ukraine is among the world's top agricultural producers and exporters and is often described as the "breadbasket of Europe". During the 2020/21 international wheat

marketing season (July–June), it ranked as the sixth-largest wheat exporter, accounting for nine percent of world wheat trade. The country is also a major global exporter of maize, barley and rapeseed. In 2020/21, it accounted for 12 percent of global trade in maize and barley and for 14 percent of world rapeseed exports. Its trade share is even greater in the sunflower oil sector, with the country accounting for about 50 percent of world exports in 2020/2021 (Hinton, 2022).

Disruptions to the grain and oilseed sectors of Ukraine were thought inevitable. On the eve of the invasion, an estimated 6 million tons of wheat and 15 million tons of corn had been readied for export. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), this would cause further loss of life and increase humanitarian needs. In addition, potential food and fertiliser export difficulties encountered by the Russian Federation, which is a major exporter of potash, ammonia, urea and other soil nutrients, as a result of economic sanctions could jeopardise the food security of many countries. Rising natural gas prices are pushing agricultural fertiliser prices higher, contributing to increasing food prices globally. Particularly vulnerable are those that are highly dependent on Ukraine and the Russian Federation for their food and fertiliser imports. Several of these countries fall into the Least Developed Country (LDC) group, while many others belong to the group of Low-Income Food-Deficit Countries (LIFDCs). For example, Eritrea sourced 47% of its wheat imports in 2021 from Ukraine. The other 53% came from the Russian Federation. Overall, more than 30 nations depend on Ukraine and Russia for over 30% of their wheat import needs, with many of them located in North Africa, and in Western and Central Asia (Morin, 2022).

A Russian attack damaged the Kozarovychi Dam which regulates flow from the Kyiv Reservoir, causing flooding along the Irpin River. A Russian missile attack on Kyiv Dam on the Dnieper River was blocked by Ukrainian defences. A breach could have triggered flooding of parts of Kyiv, damaged downstream dams, and threatened the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. Russian forces blew up the dam on the North Crimean Canal which Ukraine had erected to block water flow to agricultural lands in Crimea seized by Russia in 2014. Russians cut civilian water service as part of the Siege of Mariupol.

The Ukrainian Defence Ministry accused Russia of stealing "hundreds of thousands of tonnes of grain" from grain elevators and other storage facilities throughout occupied Ukraine, and transporting the grain to occupied ports for export. Substantial quantities of farm equipment, combine harvesters and tractors have also been looted from farms and dealerships and transported to Russia, as far away as Chechnya in some cases. Theft of grain from occupied regions of Ukraine has the potential to intensify food crises, with both the Ukrainian Minister of Agriculture and the U.N. World Food Programme warning

that this could worsen the Ukrainian food crisis, and even exacerbate global hunger. On 30 May, 2022, Russia claimed that it had started exporting last year's grain from Kherson to Russia, and were working on exporting sunflower seeds. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said: "If Kyiv solves the problem of demining ports, the Russian Navy will ensure the unimpeded passage of ships with grain to the Mediterranean Sea." According to locals, Russian soldiers were picking strawberries in Kherson Oblast.

Several African leaders said the western expansion of NATO contributed to the war, and blamed the west for food shortages and price increases. African Union head, Senegalese President Macky Sall, met with President Putin on 3 June to discuss the "liberation of the stocks of grain and fertilizers," President Sall's office said, and discuss efforts "to contribute to the lull of the war in Ukraine." He also blamed EU sanctions on Russian banks and products for worsening the situation.

Finally, there is a risk that escalating conflict between Russia and Ukraine will significantly affect wheat exports from the two countries, which account for nearly 29 per cent of the global supply. At a time when food prices are rising largely due to pandemic-related supply chain disruptions, this would further increase the threat of food insecurity.

CONCLUSIONS

On 24 February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine in a major escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian War that began in 2014. The invasion caused Europe's largest refugee crisis since World War II, with more than 8 million Ukrainians fleeing the country and a third of the population displaced. The invasion also caused global food shortages. In 2014, Russia invaded and annexed Crimea, and Russian-backed separatists seized part of the Donbas region of south-eastern Ukraine, consisting of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts, sparking a regional war. In 2021, Russia began a large military build-up along its border with Ukraine, amassing up to 190,000 troops and their equipment. In a televised address shortly before the invasion, Russian president Vladimir Putin espoused irredentist views, challenged Ukraine's right to statehood, and falsely claimed Ukraine was governed by neo-Nazis who persecuted the ethnic Russian minority. On 21 February 2022, Russia recognised the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic, two self-proclaimed breakaway statelets in Donbas controlled by pro-Russian separatists. The following day, the Federation Council of Russia authorised the use of military force, and Russian troops overtly entered both territories. The invasion began on the morning of 24 February, when Putin announced a "special military operation" to "demilitarise and denazify" Ukraine. Minutes later, missiles and airstrikes hit across

Ukraine, including the capital Kyiv. A large ground invasion followed from multiple directions. Zelenskyy enacted martial law and a general mobilisation of all male Ukrainian citizens between 18 and 60, who were banned from leaving the country. Russian attacks were initially launched on a northern front from Belarus towards Kyiv, a north-eastern front towards Kharkiv, a southern front from Crimea, and a south-eastern front from Luhansk and Donetsk. During March, the Russian advance towards Kyiv stalled. Amidst heavy losses and strong Ukrainian resistance, Russian troops retreated from Kyiv Oblast by 3 April, 2022. On 19 April, 2022, Russia launched a renewed attack on Donbas, with simultaneous missile attacks directed at Kyiv in the north and Lviv in western Ukraine. The invasion has received widespread international condemnation. The United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution condemning the invasion and demanding a full withdrawal of Russian forces. The International Court of Justice ordered Russia to suspend military operations and the Council of Europe expelled Russia. Many countries imposed sanctions on Russia, which have affected the economies of Russia and the world, and provided humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine. Protests occurred around the world; those in Russia were met with mass arrests and increased media censorship, including a ban on the words "war" and "invasion". The International Criminal Court has opened an investigation into crimes against humanity in Ukraine since 2013, as well as war crimes in the 2022 invasion.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The author declares no conflict of interest.

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